Elsewhere in the region, Malaysia made a submission to the UN in July 29 rejecting "in its entirety" China's earlier submissions to the UN regarding South China Sea sovereignty. 馬來西亞提交聯合國7/29，拒絕了中國先前提交聯合國的完全的南海主權
Earlier, on June 2, the anti-U.S. and pro-China president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, postponed a final decision on whether to terminate the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement, or VFA, in large part due to continued Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Indonesia on July 22 held a major military exercise in the region, clearly aimed at deterring further Chinese incursions into its exclusive economic zone. Even Brunei, on July 20, normally the quietest of claimants, surprisingly emphasized the need to uphold the rule of law in accordance with UNCLOS to settle disputes.
Washington should not expect much support from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, or more worryingly, Thailand, which remains a U.S. ally. 華盛頓不應該期望柬埔寨、寮國、緬甸或更令人擔憂的泰國（美國仍然是美國的盟友）提供太多支持。
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's July 29 warning to the U.S. to stop "treating China as an adversary," should also give the U.S. some pause. Singapore is a de facto security ally that has traditionally served as a bridge between the U.S. and China and the pulse of the entire region. 新加坡總理7/29警告美國停止"視中國為敵人"，應該會讓美國稍微暫停。新加坡是事實上是國安盟友，傳統上作為美中和整個地區之間的橋樑
And just because many countries are supporting U.S. objectives does not necessarily mean they are choosing the U.S. over China. Indeed, most, if not all Southeast Asian countries are very likely to remain in hedging mode to avoid antagonizing either side. 因為許多國家支持美國的目標並不一定意味他們選擇美國大於中國。 的確(大多數)如果不是全部東南亞國家很可能會保持閃躲模式以避免與任何一方對抗。
But what it does mean is that Indo-Pacific nations appear increasingly perturbed by China's behavior, and if this trend is sustained, then Beijing might further alienate these states, and perhaps others. 但是這意味著印太平洋地區似乎越來越受到中國行為的干擾，如果這種趨勢持續下去，那麼北京可能會進一步疏遠這些國家，也許以及其他國家。
Eventually, they may more actively support U.S. objectives. It is no coincidence, then, that Chinese defense minister Wei Fenghe this past week set out on a reset tour by visiting Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. 最終，他們可能更主動地支持美國的目標。 這不是巧合，中國國防部長上週出發進行重新組合之旅，訪問馬來西亞、印尼、汶萊和菲律賓。
Most notably, the U.K. and France in 2018 engaged in freedom of navigation operations and presence at sea operations in the South China Sea to challenge Chinese claims. 最值得注意的是，2018年的英國和法國從事自由導航行動自由和在南海的海上業務存在以挑戰中國的聲明
馬來西亞提交聯合國7/29，拒絕了中國先前提交聯合國的完全的南海主權
華盛頓不應該期望柬埔寨、寮國、緬甸或更令人擔憂的泰國（美國仍然是美國的盟友）提供太多支持。
新加坡總理7/29警告美國停止"視中國為敵人"，應該會讓美國稍微暫停。新加坡是事實上是國安盟友，傳統上作為美中和整個地區之間的橋樑
因為許多國家支持美國的目標並不一定意味他們選擇美國大於中國。 的確(大多數)如果不是全部東南亞國家很可能會保持閃躲模式以避免與任何一方對抗。
但是這意味著印太平洋地區似乎越來越受到中國行為的干擾，如果這種趨勢持續下去，那麼北京可能會進一步疏遠這些國家，也許以及其他國家。
最終，他們可能更主動地支持美國的目標。 這不是巧合，中國國防部長上週出發進行重新組合之旅，訪問馬來西亞、印尼、汶萊和菲律賓。
跟中共談法治最值得注意的是，2018年的英國和法國從事自由導航行動自由和在南海的海上業務存在以挑戰中國的聲明